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CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 20 1983 NUMBER 1
"A Case for Moderation"
California Western Law Review Annual
Luncheon
JUSTICE FRANK K. RICHARDSON*
It is a great privilege to be permitted to share in the annual
luncheon of the California Western Law Review. In any season,
it is always a pleasure to visit this warm and beautiful city of San
Diego and particularly in the wettest winter in Northern Califor-
nia in recent memory. As I speak today, I am well aware of that
cynical suggestion of some wag that "If all of the luncheon speak-
ers in the United States were laid end to end, it would be a very
good idea."
I do not bring any burning message. I am not here to discuss
Proposition 8.' I do not offer any profound thoughts on court re-
form. Rather, I wanted to share with you some general, perhaps
random, observations about law and lawyers. I sense today that
there are veteran judges and practitioners or teachers among you
as well as younger practitioners and students connected with the
California Western Law Review and the law school. Law reviews
traditionally live in a world of pure abstraction which nicely bal-
ances theory with reality. In this connection, perhaps those of you
on the law review have heard of the two law review editors who
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of California. A.B., with distinction, Stan-
ford University, 1935; LL.B., Stanford Law School, 1938. Phi Beta Kappa. Justice
Richardson retired December 2, 1983, after nine years of service on the California
Supreme Court. See, L. A. Daily J., Nov. 7, 1983, at 1, col. 6, for a detailing of Justice
Richardson's career and excerpts of some of his major opinions.
[Note: The Honorable Justice's remarks were delivered at the annual California
Western Law Review Luncheon, March 18, 1983, San Diego, California. The Board
of Editors of the California Western Law Review has added footnotes to the tran-
script of the address to aid the reader's understanding. Additionally, in performing
necessary textual editing, the editors unavoidably have altered the presentation from
its verbatim form; the Board, however, has sought to minimize such alterations].
1. Proposition 8, enacted by popular vote of the California general electorate in
1982, is popularly known as the "Victims' Bill of Rights" and is codified at CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
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were trapped in a well. One turned to the other and said, "O.K.,
assume a ladder."
We older veterans although in the late afternoons of our careers
remain very interested in what is happening to the profession, for
we are part of it. We have raised our families and in between the
ulcers and high blood pressure the law has been good to us. Even
though, in a sense, we are on the professional sidelines, to use the
classic expression of Yogi Berra,2 "You can observe a lot by just
watching." If you will excuse just a brief personal word-when I
joined the bar forty-four years ago, lawyer referral services were
informal and disorganized. Solicitation was strictly verboten, and
advertising was for new automobiles and breakfast cereals. Spe-
cialization was practiced, but it was neither publicized nor con-
trolled. Gasoline prices rose from thirteen cents to seventeen
cents per gallon and an excellent meal cost $1.50. In those dim,
distant days beyond recall, there was even adherence to a doctrine
we called stare decisis.
It has been given to you and me to live out our professional
years in a period of intense ferment. The tides of change have
swept over the law. There is an ancient Chinese curse-"May you
live in interesting times." It is perhaps small comfort that almost
all other disciplines and institutions have come under the skeptical
eye and dissection of intense critics. This has been true of busi-
ness and education, of governments at all levels, of medicine, reli-
gion, and of labor. Specifically, law and the courts have been the
subject of a rolling barrage of criticism. Lawyers and judges are
the targets of much mistrust and cynicism. We are not a popular
breed. There are reasons for that. Whenever litigants enter a
courtroom, one side wins and one side loses. Litigation is not an
endearing experience, and the cumulative effect of this is a hard
core of dissatisfied, disaffected citizenry. The law for most people
means restraints on behavior and this adds up to resentment and
disappointment. So, we must not be surprised that as a profession
the public does not hold us in the highest regard.
If it is any comfort to you, this hard fact of life is not new.
Recently former Senator Thomas Kuche 3 referred to a census
which had been taken in Grafton County, New Hampshire in the
2. Lawrence Peter (Yogi) Berra was a famous baseball player, coach, manager
and personality. He was elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame, 1972. 1 A. MARQUIS,
WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA, 1982-83 257 (1982).
3. Thomas H. Kuchel was a member of the California State Assembly (1937-
1940); California State Senate (1940-46); United States Senator for California (1953-
1969). He was a former member of the United States Senate appropriations interior
and insular affairs committees. A.B., cum laude, Univ. of So. Calif. 1932; J.D. 1935,
Univ. of So. Calif. 1 A. MARQUIS, WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA, 1982-83 1888 (1982).
[Vol. 20
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year 1773, before we had become a new nation. This is part of the
census: "We have a county of over 3,000 square miles, a popula-
tion of 6,549 souls of which 90 are students at Dartmouth College
and 20 are slaves. We have 25 incorporated towns all in a thriving
condition, including 4 grist mills, 5 saddle shops, 7 millwrights, 8
physicians, 17 clergymen and not a single lawyer. For this happy
state of affairs we take no credit unto ourselves, but render all to
the glory of God." We have never been included among the
saints.
Having acknowledged this, I would like, with your permission,
to interject a couple of personal observations which run against
the popular grain. I confess to a very strong bias, generated by
many years of close professional observation. I like lawyers. I
like their courage and audacity. I like their willingness to work
hard, frequently in lost causes, and their loyalty to their clients
through thick and thin. I like their comradery. I like the intellec-
tual stimulation which surrounds their work, whether in the office
or courtroom. I like their generosity of time and talent. I like the
universality of a lawyer's work, touching as it does almost every
aspect of human existence. I like the importance of the work they
do, and their ingenuity, and the opportunities for innovation and
creativity. I like the power which they possess to start and stop
official machinery and to affect its direction. I like the high ethi-
cal standards by which almost all of them live, and am very proud
of the enormous contribution they have made in our nation's
history.
In complete candor, I must say that there are some things that,
growing older, I don't like about the profession. One of them,
inherent in the adversary nature of the job itself, is the almost
constant aura of contention and combat in which we live. Al-
though the law in its goals and symmetry may be likened to a
beautiful woman, I am reminded of the poet who said that "my
wife is too beautiful for words but not for argument." Another
difficulty is the pressure of time and volume that hinders the
craftsmanlike work of drafting and trial preparation that have al-
ways been the hallmarks of good lawyering. Yet another is the
seeming vagueness about much of what we do. We frequently
deal in generalities. Justice Holmes4 once observed that
"[Llawyers spend a great deal of time shoveling smoke." We ver-
balize a lot. Our tools consist of thinking and language and per-
4. Oliver Wendell Holmes served as an Associate Justice, United States
Supreme Court (1902-1932); Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
(1899-1902), and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts (1882-
1899). Author of the American Common Law (1881). Elected to American Hall of
Fame, 1965. WEBSTER'S BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 723 (1980).
1983]
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suasion. We use neither the surgical scalpel nor the engineer's
slide rule. Rather, someone has said of us, poetically, that "We
live in a sea of words where the nouns and adjectives flow. Where
the verbs speak of action that never takes place and the sentences
come and go."
Within a different context, those same difficult burdens of con-
tention, pressure and vagueness which are borne by the advocate
rest equally upon judges.
It is perhaps useful for judges, periodically, to ask themselves a
simple question. What are we trying to do? The short answer is
that we seek to do justice on a case-by-case basis. The true func-
tion of tourts has been debated since the founding of our nation
over 200 years ago. The controversy still rages, much of it func-
tional, focusing on whether the court's true role is that of narrower
constitutional or statutory interpretation or rather that of a
broaderpolicy determinant. The constitutional founders debated
the role of the judiciary within the context of proposals that the
courts become parts of either the legislative or executive branch.
They decided that they would be neither, but rather a third branch
of government independent of the two other policy making
branches. The Founding Fathers saw the danger of unbridled ju-
dicial power, however, and limited that power through both the
federal Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
Acknowledging the impossibility of fixing a permanently satis-
fying line between proper restraint and impermissible excess, we
may be aided by identifying several areas in which courts may
have crossed the line. Echoing Lord Macaulay's5 words, "[A] gov-
ernment that attempts more than it ought ends up accomplishing
less than it should." It is my view that courts should decide the
issues in individual cases rather than expansively seek perfect jus-
tice by developing good social policy. Restraint is a necessary part
of an ordered life, whether it is a diet for the physical body, or
self-control in our personal habits.
In the judicial context, two areas are particularly troublesome:
courts that exceed their competence in the making of broad policy
decisions, and procedural devices which are aimed at realizing
perfect justice.
In this connection, it is relatively easy to agree with the princi-
ple of judicial restraint in the abstract. It is the application that
5. Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay was an English writer and statesman. He
was a member of the Supreme Council of India (1834-1838); Secretary of War (1839-
1841); and Paymaster of the Forces (1846-1847). Author of History of England (vols. I
and II, 1848; III and IV, 1855; V, 1861); Lays of Ancient Rome (1842) and numerous
essays. WEBSTER's BIOGRAPHiCAL DIcTioNARY 935 (1980).
[Vol. 20
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causes the difficulty. The mother of a small boy, having asked
him if he liked asparagus, was assured that he did. After having
served him a portion and noticing that the boy had not eaten any,
his mother said, "I thought you said you liked asparagus," to
which he replied, "I do, but not enough to eat it!" Similar reason-
ing may be at work in the matter of judicial restraint.
I suggest at least five reasons which counsel general moderation
in the decisionmaking process. First, appellate courts tradition-
ally lack real expertise in general social, economic, and technical
areas. Courts and their staffs are seldom equipped to handle well
many of the intricate technical problems which are laid at our
doorstep. We have neither the ability nor the time within which
to summon expert witnesses, or fashion solutions formulated on a
satisfying factual record. The light which is cast by a legal educa-
tion supplemented by a handful of treatises and law reviews fre-
quently cannot penetrate all of the dark corners of these problems.
Enthusiasm is not a substitute for knowledge. Courts will do well
to heed Justice Frankfurter's6 suggestion "to decide the concrete
issue and not embarass the future too much."
Second, courts are usually poorly equipped to predict with ac-
curacy the long range effects of our more far-reaching decisions.
Our adoption of broad new reforms may produce foreseeably sat-
isfactory results in a given case, but may also bring unwitting con-
fusion, uncertainty, chaos and unanticipated and undesirable side
effects as applied to future cases which factually may be a little
different.
Third, if we fail in these judicial experiments it may prove to be
very difficult to undo our mistakes. The legislature may be too
preoccupied to correct every error. Moreover, we cannot expect
Sacramento to act as a monitoring station or a juridical safety net
for the courts. We have a dramatic historic illustration in the
Supreme Court's holding in its Dred Scott decision.7 The high
court struck down the Missouri Compromise, a law of Congress,
and ruled that blacks were not citizens and had no right to sue in
federal court. It took more than another act of Congress to correct
the mistake-it took the most destructive war in history and three
constitutional amendments.
Fourth, and in a similar vein, a hyperactive court may stimulate
a counterproductive overreaction by its critics. And if the legisla-
ture is sluggish in responding there may be either a direct popular
6. Felix Frankfurter served as an Associate Justice, United States Supreme
Court (1939-1962); Professor, Harvard Law School (1914-1939). WEBSTER'S BIo-
GRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 551 (1980).
7. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
1983]
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reaction through the initiative or alternatively if the legislature
does react it also may react to correct a perceived imbalance, but
in doing so tip the scales going too far in the other direction.
Fifth, in my view is the danger of ignoring those who usually
are most directly affected in a judicial rush to achieve reform,
namely, the people. Under our constitutions, state and federal, it
is thepeople, either directly or through their legislative representa-
tives, not the courts which are entrusted with the responsibility of
making broad policy decisions. Judges are not "philosopher kings
or queens" blessed with any divine vision or possessed of perfect
blueprints for a better society.
In a similar fashion, courts can try but they cannot accomplish
perfect justice. If a physicist or a cabinetmaker seeks perfection in
his work he may not achieve it, but in making the effort he will
thereby elevate his standard and improve the quality of his per-
formance. This same principle does not necessarily apply in the
judicial arena. Procedural devices which are aimed at avoiding
every conceivable judicial error have real social costs which can
weigh heavily on the balancing scales of justice, especially in the
criminal area. When a convicted criminal is released on a techni-
cality, justice suffers in the public perception of a failing judicial
system. When citizens observe that punishment for criminal con-
duct at any level is neither swift nor certain, justice suffers. The
deterrent effect of enforcement is diluted and eroded by intermi-
nable delays in convicting, sentencing, and imprisoning.
We need not herald our mistakes nor should we attempt to hide
our fallibility. Courts cannot do perfect justice nor should we ex-
pect them to. As Justice Holmes once noted, "Every year if not
every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy
based on imperfect knowledge." Justice Learned Hands agreed,
observing "[D]ue process does not mean infallible process." Re-
cently retired appellate Justice Macklin Fleming in his provoca-
tive volume The Price of Perfect Justice9 documents vividly the
social cost we are paying for our inability to distinguish between
perfect procedure and effective procedure. Using many examples,
he urges that we broaden our understanding by balancing the
costs of striving for perfection against the rewards of such
behavior.
It is possible that by striving for perfection where perfection is
8. Learned Hand served as a Judge, Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (1924-
1951) and Federal District Court (1909-1924). Often called the "Tenth Justice of the
Supreme Court." He delivered more than 2,000 opinions and gained a reputation as
a defender of free speech. THE NEW COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 1187 (1975).
9. M. FLEMING, THE PRICE OF PERFECT JUSTICE-THE ADVERSE CONSE-
QUENCES OF CURRENT LEGAL DOCTRINE ON THE AMERICAN COURTROOM (1974).
[Vol. 20
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not possible, courts accomplish less overall justice than they
should. The historic and periodic swings of the legal pendulum
from stability and tradition to innovation and change prompted
one distinguished modem political scientist to comment recently
that age had taught him to develop politically and legally what he
called a "passion for the center."
Perhaps we would all gain if courts generally entered upon a
juridical diet, exercising a more restrained function, and leaving
policy judgments to those branches which are both equipped to
make them and which also are directly responsible to the people
who are ultimately affected by those judgments.
There is a large zone in which courts can improve. We can do
better in the handling and processing of both civil and criminal
trials. We can move civil cases to trial in less than five years,
while preserving the precedence of criminal trials. We can select a
jury in a capital case in less than six months. We can improve on
a system that requires repeated appellate examination of identical
evidentiary or procedural issues. We should be able to dispose of
a search and seizure issue in less time than four years after it
arose. We can devise a fair system of accommodation and defer-
ence between the federal and state systems which will save sub-
stantial expenses and prevent a good bit of game playing. I have
no doubt that our British cousins could teach us much if we would
listen.
Will Rogers10 had a friend who told him that he knew how to
spell "banana but didn't know how to stop." Courts of law should
explore their limits, do what they can effectively, but know how to
stop. I hope I also know how to stop, and I conclude with this
observation directed particularly at the younger practitioner and
law students.
Bombarded as the public is by negative impressions of lawyers,
their big fees, their alleged deviousness and adroitness, it seems to
me high time that a voice was raised in ringing praise of lawyers.
Although I never met a lawyer who was a literal saint, I have met
and known scores of them who were and are high principled, hard
working, honest, contributing professionals. They discharge faith-
fully and with honor the highest positions of trust. They are fidu-
ciaries in the best sense. They betray no confidences. They put
the interests of their clients above their own. They give of them-
selves in nearly hopeless causes. They are loyal to their families.
10. Will Rogers was an American humorist. He was a performing artist in
vaudeville in 1905 and the Ziegfeld Follies in 1915. He was known as the "Cowboy
Philosopher," gaining a wide audience through motion pictures, books, radio, and a
syndicated newspaper column. THE NEW COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 2343-44 (1975).
1983]
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They are protective of the poor and the ravaged as well as the rich
and powerful. Frequently, they stand alone, and as protectors of
the constitutional rights of the unpopular, become human light-
ning rods who take the abuse of the unknowing. They break new
ground and they clear new paths for the movement of the law,
frequently failing four times before they succeed once. I dare say,
with particular reference to the San Diego Bar, that there is a pro-
digious amount of pro bono publico work that is rendered by San
Diego lawyers to community service organizations, and youth,
church, and civic groups. This work is done without fanfare or a
dime of compensation and is often done while the lawyer manages
a heavy workload. The work has been going on quietly for years
in the finest traditions of the American lawyer and the public
should hear about it occasionally. I am very proud to have been a
lawyer and you should be too.
The real test for the bench and bar in the coming years will be
in the sustained quality of their competency and character. We
will demonstrate this not so much by our words as by our conduct.
Truly for these few years, this brief moment in history, it is given
to us, our generation of lawyers and judges to be the temporary
custodians of that priceless jewel in the crown of freedom-the
rule of law, to preserve the rule and to make it work amid the vast
economic, social and technical pressures of a complex and trou-
bled age. That is a task to test the strength of anyone, and of any
time. In a period of considerable individual and collective vio-
lence we work in a system of ordered liberty which no doubt is
flawed and we can improve it. However, we who work in that
system should always bear in mind that it is a very rare but essen-
tial component of that veneer of civilization, though thin, none-
theless protects us all.
I am grateful to you new friends for the privilege of sharing this
luncheon today and I wish for each of you continued success.
Thank you so much.
[Vol. 20
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